**Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics**

Volume: 69;
2011;
171 pp;
Hardcover

MSC: Primary 91;

Print ISBN: 978-0-8218-5326-9

Product Code: PSAPM/69

List Price: $55.00

Individual Member Price: $44.00

**Electronic ISBN: 978-0-8218-9285-5
Product Code: PSAPM/69.E**

List Price: $55.00

Individual Member Price: $44.00

# Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Share this page *Edited by *
*Karl Sigmund*

This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short
Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4–5, 2011 in
New Orleans, Louisiana.

Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions
in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of
classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess
each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase
their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary
game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social
dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in
animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in
computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design
and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents
(for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data
packets over the Internet).

While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by
directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system,
attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the
agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead
them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional
assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for
the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in
populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision
rules.

#### Table of Contents

# Table of Contents

## Evolutionary Game Dynamics

- Contents v6 free
- Preface vii8 free
- Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory 110 free
- Beyond the Symmetric Normal Form: Extensive Form Games, Asymmetric Games and Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces 2736
- Deterministic Evolutionary Game Dynamics 6170
- On Some Global and Unilateral Adaptive Dynamics 8190
- Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Foundations, Deterministic Approximation, and Equilibrium Selection 111120
- Evolution of Cooperation in Finite Populations 143152
- Index 173182

#### Readership

Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in game theory and dynamical systems.