| Softcover ISBN: | 978-0-8218-9866-6 |
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| Softcover ISBN: | 978-0-8218-9866-6 |
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| Softcover ISBN: | 978-0-8218-9866-6 |
| Product Code: | CONM/624 |
| List Price: | $130.00 |
| MAA Member Price: | $117.00 |
| AMS Member Price: | $104.00 |
| eBook ISBN: | 978-1-4704-1930-1 |
| Product Code: | CONM/624.E |
| List Price: | $125.00 |
| MAA Member Price: | $112.50 |
| AMS Member Price: | $100.00 |
| Softcover ISBN: | 978-0-8218-9866-6 |
| eBook ISBN: | 978-1-4704-1930-1 |
| Product Code: | CONM/624.B |
| List Price: | $255.00 $192.50 |
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Book DetailsContemporary MathematicsVolume: 624; 2014; 229 ppMSC: Primary 91
This volume contains the proceedings of two AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games, held January 4, 2012, in Boston, MA, and January 11–12, 2013, in San Diego, CA.
Decision theory, voting theory, and game theory are three intertwined areas of mathematics that involve making optimal decisions under different contexts. Although these areas include their own mathematical results, much of the recent research in these areas involves developing and applying new perspectives from their intersection with other branches of mathematics, such as algebra, representation theory, combinatorics, convex geometry, dynamical systems, etc.
The papers in this volume highlight and exploit the mathematical structure of decisions, elections, and games to model and to analyze problems from the social sciences.
ReadershipGraduate students and research mathematicians interested in decision making, voting, and games.
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Table of Contents
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Articles
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Carl Corcoran and Karen Saxe — Redistricting and district compactness
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Zeph Landau and Francis Edward Su — Fair division and redistricting
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Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour — When does approval voting make the “right choices”?
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Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato — How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
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Catherine Stenson — Weighted voting, threshold functions, and zonotopes
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Karl-Dieter Crisman — The Borda Count, the Kemeny Rule, and the Permutahedron
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Maria Margaret Klawe, Kathryn L. Nyman, Jacob N. Scott and Francis Edward Su — Double-interval societies
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Matt Davis, Michael E. Orrison and Francis Edward Su — Voting for committees in agreeable societies
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Thomas C. Ratliff — Selecting diverse committees with candidates from multiple categories
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Brian Hopkins — Expanding the Robinson-Goforth system for $2 \times 2$ games
-
Daniel T. Jessie and Donald G. Saari — Cooperation in $n$-player repeated games
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Michael A. Jones and Jennifer M. Wilson — The dynamics of consistent bankruptcy rules
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Additional Material
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RequestsReview Copy – for publishers of book reviewsPermission – for use of book, eBook, or Journal contentAccessibility – to request an alternate format of an AMS title
- Book Details
- Table of Contents
- Additional Material
- Requests
This volume contains the proceedings of two AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games, held January 4, 2012, in Boston, MA, and January 11–12, 2013, in San Diego, CA.
Decision theory, voting theory, and game theory are three intertwined areas of mathematics that involve making optimal decisions under different contexts. Although these areas include their own mathematical results, much of the recent research in these areas involves developing and applying new perspectives from their intersection with other branches of mathematics, such as algebra, representation theory, combinatorics, convex geometry, dynamical systems, etc.
The papers in this volume highlight and exploit the mathematical structure of decisions, elections, and games to model and to analyze problems from the social sciences.
Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in decision making, voting, and games.
-
Articles
-
Carl Corcoran and Karen Saxe — Redistricting and district compactness
-
Zeph Landau and Francis Edward Su — Fair division and redistricting
-
Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour — When does approval voting make the “right choices”?
-
Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato — How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
-
Catherine Stenson — Weighted voting, threshold functions, and zonotopes
-
Karl-Dieter Crisman — The Borda Count, the Kemeny Rule, and the Permutahedron
-
Maria Margaret Klawe, Kathryn L. Nyman, Jacob N. Scott and Francis Edward Su — Double-interval societies
-
Matt Davis, Michael E. Orrison and Francis Edward Su — Voting for committees in agreeable societies
-
Thomas C. Ratliff — Selecting diverse committees with candidates from multiple categories
-
Brian Hopkins — Expanding the Robinson-Goforth system for $2 \times 2$ games
-
Daniel T. Jessie and Donald G. Saari — Cooperation in $n$-player repeated games
-
Michael A. Jones and Jennifer M. Wilson — The dynamics of consistent bankruptcy rules
