xxi ifferent kinds of player, and in such a wide variety of e should never expect game-theoretic ideas that are ntext to be relevant in another (although we should the possibility that they might be). Nevertheless, ising solution concepts—i.e., concepts of what is the compromise—have ultimately failed to be satisfac- circumstances for which they were designed, and so s them.5 We concentrate instead on introducing and hat still hold promise, in particular, Nash equilib- ), evolutionarily stable strategy (Chapters 2 and 6), (Chapter 3), core, nucleolus, Shapley value (Chap- ration via reciprocity (Chapter 5). games are classified as either cooperative or nonco- gh this dichotomy is universally acknowledged to be t every conflict has an element of cooperation, and ration has an element of conflict. In this regard we ss, by tradition: Chapters 1, 2 and 6 are about non- tion concepts, whereas Chapters 3 and 4 are about . But the distinction is blurred in Chapter 5, where ation within the context of a noncooperative game. classified as having either strategic form or charac- form.6 For present purposes, it will suffice to say n characteristic function form if the conflict is anal- a pie among players who would each like all of it, vely can obtain all of it, but who as individuals can- f it and that otherwise a game is in strategic form. d in characteristic function form in Chapter 4, where xample, how to split the costs of a car pool fairly. ed in strategic form in Chapters 1-3, 5 and 6, where other things, the behavior of motorists at a 4-way etting by store managers territorial conflict among cts or spiders and food sharing among ravens. games in the wider context of optimization theory, there is no discussion of the stable set, Von Neumann and Mor- oncept for characteristic function games. s further distinguish between strategic games in extensive form in normal form, but we have no use for this distinction. See, for 017-1021] or [173, pp. 1-5].
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