1. Noncooperative Games otorist, say San, is travelling south but would like to go San cannot proceed simultaneously one must proceed er. Then who should it be? How should the motorists 's potential for conflict that's fit for a game. We will Crossroads. matters simple, let's suppose that a motorist has but she can either wait for the other motorist to turn first, we shall say that she selects pure strategy W or she can rn and hope that the other motorist will refrain from hich case we shall say that she selects pure strategy G.1 ord strategy because we wish to think of Nan as the first ecision maker, and of San as the second player, in a 2- and we call G and W pure strategies to distinguish them rategies, which we shall introduce in §1.3. If Nan selects X, and if San selects pure strategy Y, then we shall say ers have jointly selected the pure strategy combination r game has precisely four pure strategy combinations, GW, WG and WW. e where each player decides to defer to the other (WW), he time they spend dithering and frantically waving to efore one of them eventually moves. Likewise, in the ch decides not to defer (GG), let 5 denote the time they ating each other in the middle of the junction, until one ually backs down. It seems reasonable to suppose that waste if both are selfish (GG) exceeds that which they are altruistic (WW), even if not by much and we shall me throughout the text that 0 e 5 o o , close to 1. Let T\ denote the time it takes Nan to nego- without interruption, i.e., the time that elapses (if San tween her front bumper crossing NX in Figure 1.1 and per crossing EY\ and let TI denote the corresponding We are now in a position to analyze the confrontation oint of view. the agenda that, in place of epicene pronouns, female pronouns will er 1, male pronouns in Chapter 2, and so on.
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