s: a motorist's dilemma 5 layed repeatedly, the 4-way junction at which Nan eed not be the same junction every time—a similar ice. some qualifying remarks are in order. Sans that the purposes of our model must, in theory, all take ate a junction unimpeded—or, which is more to the think that they will all take time T2. In practice, s limited ability to size up the driver who confronts across the junction. Perhaps the best she can do is nent in one of a finite number of classes. She may, sify her opponents as fast, intermediate or slow in an flits from junction to junction, not one game but played repeatedly, a game for slow Sans, a game for s and a game for fast Sans. (More generally, some games would be played repeatedly.) On the other not imagine that it is totally unrealistic to suppose ent is the same San every time—perhaps they meet , and at the same place, as they travel to work in pposite directions. e matrix in Table 1.1, we analyzed the game from ew. A similar analysis, from San's viewpoint, yields in Table 1.2. Indeed it is hardly necessary to repeat ause the only difference between Nan and San that to our model of their conflict—or, as game theorists only asymmetry between the players—is that Nan's be different from San's (TI ^ T2). Thus San's payoff nspose of Nan's with suffix 2 replaced by suffix 1. necessary because rows correspond to strategies of umns to those of Player 2, in both tables. game theory, the payoff matrices in Tables 1.1 and yer game in which each player has two pure strate- If we assume that Nan and San act out of rational that they cannot communicate prior to the game, comes a noncooperative one. (As we shall discover at really distinguishes a noncooperative game from me is the inability to make commitments but the ssibly make binding agreements if they cannot even
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