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Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann
 
Edited by: Myrna H. Wooders University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
A co-publication of the AMS and Fields Institute
Front Cover for Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory
Available Formats:
Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-8218-0525-1
Product Code: FIC/23
291 pp 
List Price: $110.00
MAA Member Price: $99.00
AMS Member Price: $88.00
Electronic ISBN: 978-1-4704-3047-4
Product Code: FIC/23.E
291 pp 
List Price: $103.00
MAA Member Price: $92.70
AMS Member Price: $82.40
Bundle Print and Electronic Formats and Save!
This product is available for purchase as a bundle. Purchasing as a bundle enables you to save on the electronic version.
List Price: $165.00
MAA Member Price: $148.50
AMS Member Price: $132.00
Front Cover for Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory
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  • Front Cover for Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory
  • Back Cover for Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory
Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann
Edited by: Myrna H. Wooders University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
A co-publication of the AMS and Fields Institute
Available Formats:
Hardcover ISBN:  978-0-8218-0525-1
Product Code:  FIC/23
291 pp 
List Price: $110.00
MAA Member Price: $99.00
AMS Member Price: $88.00
Electronic ISBN:  978-1-4704-3047-4
Product Code:  FIC/23.E
291 pp 
List Price: $103.00
MAA Member Price: $92.70
AMS Member Price: $82.40
Bundle Print and Electronic Formats and Save!
This product is available for purchase as a bundle. Purchasing as a bundle enables you to save on the electronic version.
List Price: $165.00
MAA Member Price: $148.50
AMS Member Price: $132.00
  • Book Details
     
     
    Fields Institute Communications
    Volume: 231999
    MSC: Primary 91;

    Since the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics.

    This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, “Acceptable Points in General Cooperative \(n\)-Person Games” and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, “The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member”. This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice.

    The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

    Readership

    Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in economics, game theory, and applications.

  • Table of Contents
     
     
    • Chapters
    • Robert Aumann - Acceptable points in general cooperative $n$-person games
    • Non-cooperative game theory
    • Erik Balder - Young measure techniques for existence of Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibria
    • Steven Brams - Modeling free choice in games
    • Cooperative game theory
    • Theo Driessen - Pairwise-bargained consistency and game theory: The case of a two-sided firm
    • Juan Martínez-Legaz - A new characterization of totally balanced games
    • Michael Maschler - The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member
    • Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen - Bargaining between heterogeneous organizations
    • Richard McLean - Coalition structure values of mixed games
    • Lakshmi Raut - Aumann-Shapely random order values of non-atomic games
    • Economics and social choice
    • Beth Allen - On the existence of core allocations in a large economy with incentive-compatibility constraints
    • Bhaskar Chakravorti, John Conley and Bart Taub - Economic applications of probabilistic cheap talk
    • Peter Hammond - Multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms in random Aumann-Hildenbrand macroeconomies
    • Frank Page, Jr. and Myrna Wooders - Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability
    • Norman Schofield - A smooth social choice method of preference aggregation
    • Martin Shubik and Myrna Wooders - Clubs, near markets and market games
    • Arja Turunen-Red and Alan Woodland - On economic applications of the Kuhn-Fourier theorem
    • Jun Wako - Coalition-proofness of the competitive allocations in an indivisible goods market
  • Request Review Copy
Volume: 231999
MSC: Primary 91;

Since the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics.

This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, “Acceptable Points in General Cooperative \(n\)-Person Games” and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, “The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member”. This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice.

The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

Readership

Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in economics, game theory, and applications.

  • Chapters
  • Robert Aumann - Acceptable points in general cooperative $n$-person games
  • Non-cooperative game theory
  • Erik Balder - Young measure techniques for existence of Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibria
  • Steven Brams - Modeling free choice in games
  • Cooperative game theory
  • Theo Driessen - Pairwise-bargained consistency and game theory: The case of a two-sided firm
  • Juan Martínez-Legaz - A new characterization of totally balanced games
  • Michael Maschler - The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member
  • Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen - Bargaining between heterogeneous organizations
  • Richard McLean - Coalition structure values of mixed games
  • Lakshmi Raut - Aumann-Shapely random order values of non-atomic games
  • Economics and social choice
  • Beth Allen - On the existence of core allocations in a large economy with incentive-compatibility constraints
  • Bhaskar Chakravorti, John Conley and Bart Taub - Economic applications of probabilistic cheap talk
  • Peter Hammond - Multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms in random Aumann-Hildenbrand macroeconomies
  • Frank Page, Jr. and Myrna Wooders - Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability
  • Norman Schofield - A smooth social choice method of preference aggregation
  • Martin Shubik and Myrna Wooders - Clubs, near markets and market games
  • Arja Turunen-Red and Alan Woodland - On economic applications of the Kuhn-Fourier theorem
  • Jun Wako - Coalition-proofness of the competitive allocations in an indivisible goods market
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